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Abstract 
While the features of successful policy transfer are well known, there is some evidence that 
increase in policy transfer is associated with convergence of not just policies but institutional 
and organisational forms. Institutional isomorphism is often a result of copying organisational 
form as a way of securing legitimacy rather than seeking successful policy outcomes. It is 
also influenced by the convergence of the neoliberal paradigm over recent decades which 
decreases the likelihood of selecting or implementing disruptive policies. 
 
This paper interrogates policy transfer as both a normative process of sharing “best practice” 
and a mimetic process of copying organisational form in order to secure legitimacy. There is 
a danger that, rather than focusing on good implementation of existing policies, new policies 
are continually sought, which is often encouraged by isomorphic institutional forms driven by 
political motivations to reduce public responsibilities for unsuccessful or unpopular policies.  
 
The aim of this paper is to develop the conceptual tools for analysis of how and when policy 
transfer becomes policy churn and the role of institutionally isomorphic tendencies in this 
transition. 
 
Key words: policy transfer, institutions, diffusion, neoliberal, convergence, governance, 
implementation, transport 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades a body of literature has developed on policy transfer, some of 
the key outputs of which have been based on empirical application to the transport sector. 
Previous research has established the key features of policy transfer and the factors that 
facilitate and constrain it. There is some evidence that an increase in policy transfer is 
associated with convergence of not just policies themselves but institutional and 
organisational forms. This convergence is influenced by several factors, such as securing 
legitimacy in the eyes of other organisations as well as the public and the media, linked to the 
change in many countries from a Keynesian interventionist political paradigm to a neoliberal 
market-based approach which increases the difficulty of implementing disruptive policies. An 
unresolved question is whether and how institutional isomorphism constrains the transfer 
process, increasing the likelihood of failure and leading to an ongoing turnover of policy. 
While the institutional literature occasionally mentions policy churn, it remains 
overlooked in the policy transfer literature. Marschall and Shah (2005; p. 165), drawing on 
Hess (1999), define policy churn as “when policies are passed that do not satisfy the interests 
of all stakeholders, . . . the adoption of a policy by a new set of stakeholders, and then 
subsequent readoption of newer reforms (advocated by another set of stakeholders).” Thus 
the role of stakeholders and decision makers, as well as popularity and collective agreement 
are central to the issue: “because each educational problem has numerous possible solutions, 
and because stakeholders cannot agree on which one would be best, each of them gets applied 
at some point in time” (Marschall and Shah, 2005; p. 172). This disagreement on which 
policy is most suitable derives from the difficulty in comparing and benchmarking, thus what 
is presented as a rational process is in practice open to several influences. According to Peck 
(2011; p. 6), “learning and diffusion are politically channelled, rather than ‘open’ processes.” 
In this paper, the focus is on the influence of institutional isomorphism and how the particular 
way in which it bounds rationality can lead to sub-optimal policy transfer outcomes. 
Policy churn is defined in this paper as changing a policy without establishing a clear link 
between the reasons for failure of the existing policy and how these will be overcome by the 
new policy. Policy churn is distinguished from policy transfer as it derives not solely from 
boundedly rational seeking of better policies (the way policy transfer is generally 
characterised) but from processes of institutional isomorphism. Or to rephrase, the process is 
boundedly rational but the interest is on the influences that bound it. A new policy may not be 
randomly selected but it will be chosen from a reduced set of alternatives and possibly while 
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decision makers are under pressure to be doing something without sufficient evidence that the 
change would be better than the current policy. Policy churn can manifest as an unnecessary 
transition to a new policy instrument rather than simply devoting more resources to the 
implementation of the current instrument, or indeed solving the underlying cause of the 
problem. For example, rather than reducing unemployment by policies to create more jobs, 
seeking to try new policies of incentivised welfare payments (Peck & Theodore, 2001). In the 
case of transport, governments prefer to encourage people to change their behaviour 
voluntarily (i.e. to travel less or by more sustainable modes) rather than using policies such as 
road charging to make driving less attractive (Marsden et al., 2014) or undertaking the more 
difficult but ultimately more successful task of reframing the overall discourse on mobility by 
challenging the pro-car narrative (Schwanen et al., 2012). 
In order to maintain conceptual clarity regarding policy churn, it is necessary first to 
identify at which point on the spectrum churn is likely to occur. In terms of Hall’s (1993) 
three orders of policy, the third order is changing the higher level policy goals, the second 
order is changing the instruments and the first order is calibration of policy instruments. 
Howlett and Cashore (2009) expanded Hall’s three orders to six: goals, objectives, settings, 
instrument logic, mechanisms (the term “instruments” is preferred throughout this paper) and 
calibrations. This typology allows greater nuance, for example maintaining a goal (e.g. 
reduce negative environmental effects) and objective (e.g. reduce emissions from transport) 
but changing the instrument logic (preferences for encouraging tax cuts on electric cars or a 
punitive tax increase on combustion engines). Hall’s theory suggests that policy churn takes 
place mostly in the first and second order, which occur within an existing policy system, 
while third level change requires an exogenous influence or paradigm change. Using the 
terminology of Howlett and Cashore, the higher level policy goals and objectives generally 
remain unchanged but institutional isomorphism can narrow the settings and instrument logic 
that determine the selection of acceptable policy instruments and calibrations. These are then 
less likely to be strong enough to succeed, leading to new instruments nonetheless chosen 
from within the same restricted pool, leading to churn.  
So it is at this point of the policy spectrum that institutional isomorphism directs policy 
churn which manifests primarily at the two lowest levels of instrument and calibration. For 
example, reducing emissions remains the objective, because changing it would be politically 
unpopular, but reducing it through electric vehicles gains priority over a reduction in travel 
(logic), which is difficult to achieve in the absence of stringent disincentives (instruments) 
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that are considered politically unacceptable (particularly at the chosen level of calibration). In 
some cases neither the previous nor the new instrument is expected to succeed but neoliberal 
governance forms prevent the disruption of the policy setting or logic (see Section 4). This 
paper explores how the convergence of organisational forms due to increased policy transfer 
both draws on and feeds into wider processes of institutional isomorphism. The result is an 
ongoing turnover of the transferred policy instruments, where a succession of new policies 
are implemented in order to secure and retain legitimacy of policy makers rather than 
focusing on the lessons of successful implementation that are already well covered in the 
implementation literature. 
The goal is to identify some of the key elements that turn transfer into churn and how the 
organisational form facilitates or constrains this process. The intention is not to suggest that 
transfer is really just churn. By identifying factors that influence how policy transfer can 
become policy churn, the framework developed in this paper can improve the quality and 
efficacy of policy transfer and help prevent potentially valuable transfer initiatives 
descending into negative churn effects. The framework will need to be calibrated through 
empirical testing, subject to the difficulties of measuring, comparing and benchmarking 
policy (Gudmundsson et al., 2005; Howlett and Cashore, 2009). As many of the key 
theoretical and empirical outputs on policy transfer have been developed through application 
to the transport sector, a particular focus is on this area of policy, although the key issues 
identified and the analytical framework produced are generalizable to other policy contexts. 
 Section two introduces the concept of institutional isomorphism and its normative, 
mimetic and coercive forms. This process is occurring for several reasons, with and without 
policy transfer, leading to a convergence of (particularly neoliberal) organisational forms. 
Section three defines and critiques the policy transfer process, highlighting how previous 
work on policy transfer has tended to overlook two aspects. First, how the already existing 
processes of institutional isomorphism bound the rationality of policy transfer, and second, 
how policy transfer itself occurs in an institutionally isomorphic way by encouraging the 
convergence of organisational forms. Section four demonstrates how policy churn results 
from these processes, whereby the policy transfer process is not as rational as it is sometimes 
presented, being bounded by influences such as political acceptability (in which 
neoliberalism plays a large role), the serendipity of policy selection and the role of individual 
actors, including politicians, planners and experts. Section five derives a framework of ten 
factors that influence the transition from policy transfer to policy churn, provides empirical 
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examples of each and discusses the methodological challenges in research design for a full 
application of the framework to a longitudinal case. Section six concludes with a research 
agenda, including the role of politicians, planners and experts, whether there is a trend of the 
kinds of policies that are more likely to be churned and whether this correlates with a 
reluctance to devote the necessary resources to implementation. 
 
2. Institutional isomorphism 
The concept of institutional isomorphism developed out of the structuration of 
organisational fields, building on the work of Giddens (1979). According to DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983): 
 
The process of institutional definition, or “structuration”, consists of four parts: an 
increase in the extent of interaction among organizations in the field; the emergence of 
sharply defined interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition; an 
increase in the information load with which organizations in a field must contend; and the 
development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set or organizations that they 
are involved in a common enterprise (p. 148). 
 
They go on to describe institutional isomorphism, first by distinguishing it from competitive 
isomorphism, whereby, subject to the assumption of competitive markets, the most efficient 
solution will emerge due to competition. Institutional isomorphism, by contrast, results from 
drivers such as the need to seek legitimacy: “Organizations compete not just for resources 
and customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as 
economic fitness” (p. 150). 
Three types of institutional isomorphism are identified: coercive, stemming from political 
influence, mimetic, resulting from uncertainty, and normative, associated with 
professionalization: “Organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in 
their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful” (p. 152). Moreover: 
 
Institutional isomorphic processes can be expected to proceed in the absence of evidence 
that it increases internal organizational efficiency. . . . Similarity can make it easier for 
organizations to transact with other organizations, to attract career-minded staff, to be 
acknowledged as legitimate and reputable, and to fit into administrative categories that 
define eligibility for public and private grants and contracts. None of this, however, 
ensures that conformist organizations do what they do more efficiently than do their more 
deviant peers (p. 153). 
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A number of hypotheses are derived from this analysis, predicting that institutional 
isomorphism is more likely to occur as a result of the existence of factors such as inter-
organisational dependence, uncertainty between means and end, ambiguity of goals, reliance 
on academic and professional credentials and the greater centrality of resource supply and 
greater dependence on a small number of sources for vital resources.  
A convergence in transport policy across devolved transport authorities in the UK was 
identified by Shaw et al. (2009), driven by political pressure to emulate (as the same political 
party was at that time in power across all of these jurisdictions) as well as limited knowledge 
or motivation to explore alternatives. The authors suggest (p. 564) that this convergence 
“seems to reflect the pressures on the devolved administrations to appear legitimate, 
encouraging lock in to existing strategic frameworks and the opportunistic borrowing of 
specific policy measures.” This suggests evidence of institutional isomorphism, which leads 
the authors to hypothesise that “devolution and institutional immaturity, coupled with the 
inexperience of key personnel, promotes isomorphism because of the great uncertainty that it 
generates.” (p564). They go on to state that, while this situation may change over time, “the 
devolved administrations will continue to operate within a shared organisation field 
characterised by great uncertainty and an enduring search for legitimacy, suggesting that 
isomorphic processes will remain a feature of the new territorial politics of devolution” 
(p564). Some evidence of divergence has in fact appeared in recent years, due to political 
fragmentation and “nation building” in UK devolved administrations, notably the 
administration of the Scottish National Party in Scotland (Chaney, 2014). Yet Morphet and 
Clifford (2014) note that a shared civil service culture across the UK acts to limit policy 
divergence even between different political parties. 
Evans and Davies (1999) draw on Cerny’s (1992) use of the competition state (“the state 
increasingly using new forms of economic intervention intended to marketize the state itself 
as well as to promote the competitive advantage of national industrial and financial activities 
within a relatively open world economy” p. 241) to suggest that “the policy agenda of the 
competition state is where we are most likely to locate examples of policy transfer” (p. 373). 
This finding reflects the work of Timms (2011) regarding the evolution of EU transport 
policy to a more economical than sustainable bent, i.e. transport investment is good because it 
leads to economic development (cf. Stead, 2008). Isomorphism thus represents the increasing 
similarity of state forms, the better to be co-opted into globalised neoliberal norms. From 
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here, what is politically acceptable becomes narrower (Peck, 2001) and any real disjunctive 
policy intervention, such as one that threatens economic growth, becomes less likely. 
On the other hand, it is important not to overemphasize convergence, as a focus on such 
broad trends can mask a variety of geographically scaled governance forms (Marsh and 
Sharman, 2009; Heichel et al., 2005; Peck et al., 2009). Jarvis’s study of the Hong Kong 
education system revealed that it is possible to subvert convergence processes to produce 
“forms of regulatory or even organizational performativity that ‘comply’ without complying” 
(p. 250) because, drawing on Weiss (2012), neo-liberal competition states and developmental 
regulation states may exist simultaneously. The latter exist through “the politics and 
ceremony that pervade much modern organizational life” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 
150 quoted approvingly by Jarvis). In other words, it is the peopled organisation that matters, 
even if official institutional forms appear isomorphic. This suggests more evidence of the 
need for a structure/agency approach, which will be taken up in Section 4. 
In any case, the point is not necessarily that all organisations and policies have converged 
into some dastardly neoliberal cabal, but that the dominant neoliberal paradigm, according to 
which the role of the state is seen as less interventional, influences institutional structure and 
the kind of policies selected. Yet it can work in counter-intuitive ways. As shown by 
Docherty & Shaw (2011), the UK Labour government (1997-2010) had large majorities in its 
first two terms and began with rather bold sustainable transport policy goals. Yet a lack of 
implementation led to ever more policy documents being produced, which, despite their 
retention of the same policy goals, in fact changed and watered down the actual policy 
instruments. By contrast, Headicar (2009) notes that the UK Conservative government (1979-
1997) had very little in the way of published transport strategy but they still made significant 
changes to transport governance across the UK, including widespread privatisation of 
infrastructure and operations and centralisation of planning responsibilities. According to 
Docherty and Shaw (2011; p.232): “It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the DfT might 
have deployed its resources more effectively by actually delivering policy rather than 
continually seeking to rework it.”  
As a supranational institution, the EU uses isomorphism to obtain legitimacy, which it 
lacks because of its democratic deficit (Radaelli, 2000). Legitimacy may also be sought for 
policies that already exist, whereby a brand new policy is likely to be more acceptable if it is 
presented as being drawn from “best practice” elsewhere. Using DiMaggio and Powell’s 
three sources of institutional isomorphism, Radaelli identifies that, in the case of the EU, 
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mimetic processes derive from the need for legitimacy, whereas normative pressures are 
found from the group of policy experts referred to earlier in the paper, “a common cognitive 
base and a shared legitimization of occupational autonomy which make organizational 
structures similar one to another” (p. 28).  
Moreover, while Radaelli (2000) notes that coercive institutional isomorphism is less 
likely in the EU, in a related analysis focusing on the motive for transfer (cf. Dolowitz and 
Marsh’s continuum from voluntary to coerced) Bulmer and Padgett (2004) suggest that in the 
EU policy transfer does not necessarily occur in domestic policies like transport instruments. 
The most successful transfers are actually the coerced and negotiated ones regarding macro 
level finance mechanisms, which occur in the “more highly institutionalized governance 
regimes” (p. 103), whereas “in the very weakly institutionalized mode of governance by 
facilitated unilateralism, extant policy preferences and practices may play a more decisive 
role” (p. 124). Therefore neoliberal isomorphic tendencies may be more prevalent in the 
design of higher level economic structures than lower level “on the ground” issues like 
transport, where local decisions will remain important. 
Similarly, Peck (2011) addresses international institutions pushing neoliberal reforms on 
individual countries on the basis that it “worked elsewhere.” While Marsden et al. (2012) find 
little evidence for coercive policy transfer in developed countries, supranational organisations 
such as the World Bank and the IMF influence policies of privatisation of transport industries 
in developing countries, for example bus rapid transit (BRT) (Paget-Seekins, 2015) and the 
increased role of private operators in the port sector (Wilmsmeier and Monios, 2015). Even in 
developed countries similar issues may be at play, whereby local politicians may control the 
level of coercion by pushing for more or less policy transfer depending on their political 
motives and public acceptability. These issues can be related to concerns raised by Peck 
(2011) and Marsden et al. (2012) regarding evaluating and selecting appropriate policies to 
transfer from elsewhere that are often based on the paradigm or worldview of those doing the 
transfer rather than a neutral value-free process. 
The role of neoliberalism in the policy process is defined for the purposes of this 
discussion as seeking “to maximise the role of market mechanisms in public policy and 
service provision” (Docherty et al., 2004; p. 257). In recent decades, the provision of 
transport services and to a lesser extent the development of infrastructure have been 
increasingly outsourced to the private sector, sometimes through regulated franchise 
monopolies (e.g. the right to operate all passenger trains within a geographical area) and in 
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others through an open competitive market where the public sector operator competes 
directly with private operators or withdraws from the market, perhaps running only those 
unprofitable services that are unattractive to private operators but deemed as socially 
necessary by the government (e.g. rural bus routes). A full discussion of the role of 
neoliberalism in transport policy is beyond the scope of this paper, where the focus is on how 
institutional isomorphism (on which neoliberalism is only one, albeit important, influence) 
leads to a limitation in the kinds of policy instruments selected. It is interesting that Docherty 
et al. (2004) identified some evidence of a reengagement by government in transport policy, 
potentially a move away from marketization, yet, looking back now at the weakness of the 
policy instruments selected (see discussion of behavioural change nudges rather than 
disincentives in Section 4) it is argued here that these attempts took place within a neoliberal 
paradigm that limited the range of acceptable actions. For example, Aldred (2012; p. 95) 
demonstrates that “cycling became embedded in public policy only after policy-making had 
been variously outsourced to private, quasi-private, and voluntary organisations.” Thus, 
rather than introducing strong policy instruments, the state relied on non-state organisations  
to deliver change, avoiding the need to introduce unpopular policies, devote resources or 
modify the wider policy setting by disincentivising driving. 
Western neoliberal political forms are not the only governance structures that influence 
policy choices, nor do they always produce similar outcomes, as shown by evidence from the 
Global South (Parnell and Robinson, 2012). Paget-Seekins (2015) shows how the 
introduction of private BRT schemes has been used in South America to overcome a 
fragmented and unregulated public transport sector that was providing low quality services 
and leading to congestion and emissions problems. By restructuring the bus market through 
the construction of route based monopolies contracted to private operators, the government 
was able to regulate service levels and quality, and the new system also provides workers 
with collective action opportunities to protect their interests unavailable in the previous 
informal market. On the other hand, small local operators are forced out of the market and the 
state now pays subsidy to large private operators, so while neoliberalism can in some cases 
counterintuitively lead to progressive goals, these are still achieved within market-based 
assumptions and norms.  
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3. Policy transfer 
The seminal papers by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000) drew on earlier scholars such as 
Rose (1991, 1993) and Bennet (1991) to establish the framework of policy transfer that still 
forms the basis of research in the field, according to seven key questions:  
 
1. Why do actors engage in policy transfer?  
2. Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process?  
3. What is transferred?  
4. From where are lessons drawn?  
5. What are the different degrees of transfer?  
6. What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process?  
7. How is the process of policy transfer related to policy “success” or policy “failure”? 
 
One of the key issues raised by Dolowitz and Marsh beyond the simple framework questions 
are the necessary distinction between voluntary and coercive transfer, a point taken up by 
later authors, some of whom also investigate the processes and relationships between the key 
actors, in particular the roles of policy entrepreneurs/experts and supra-national institutions 
such as the EU (e.g. Stone, 2004). Objects of transfer can be a range of things: policy goals, 
structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; ideology; 
ideas, attitudes and concepts; and negative lessons, while constraints on transfer include 
policy complexity, past policies and institutional structure. 
The four degrees of transfer identified by Dolowitz and Marsh are copying, emulation, 
mixtures and inspiration. Deeper questions asked include (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; p. 7): 
 
Do different actors get involved at different stages of the policy transfer process? When is 
policy transfer likely to occur within the policy-making cycle? How does the type of 
transfer vary depending upon when it occurs within the policy-making cycle? (For 
example, is it more likely to be inspirational transfer during the agenda-setting stage 
while a mixture during the policy-formulation stage?) Do different agents of transfer 
engage in different types of transfer? (For example, do politicians attempt to copy 
“foreign” models while bureaucrats work at developing new programs based upon a 
mixture of different ideas and programs?)  
 
The authors also explore the relation between the location on the continuum between 
voluntary and coerced transfer, and the success or failure of a policy, identifying uninformed, 
incomplete and inappropriate transfer.  
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The framework has been explored and expanded by later authors, specifically in the field 
of transport such as Marsden and Stead (2011). Timms (2011) added an important top-down 
and bottom-up disaggregation of these issues, illuminating the critical need to be aware of the 
perspective, i.e. whose motive is the transfer and who benefits? An excellent summary of the 
key aspects of policy transfer in the field of transport is provided by Marsden et al. (2011; p. 
510), based on a comprehensive review of 30 transport policies across a range of 11 cities: 
 
The overwhelming majority of searches for new policies are spontaneous, bottom-up 
actions driven either by identified shortcomings in urban strategies (which will not be 
solved by applying current tools) or by curiosity and a desire for continual improvement 
amongst staff. Some searches are driven by political intervention, legislation or the 
availability of funding streams. Political intervention in particular can provide impetus to 
a search process. Local government officials are the dominant players involved in both 
the initiation and search for new policies (though this finding may have been influenced 
by our sampling approach). Politicians, residents and interest groups play a role in 
initiating the search for new policies whilst consultants and suppliers are more engaged in 
the consideration of different options.  
 
Two of the key aspects of relevance to this paper, derived from Dolowitz and Marsh and 
addressed in more detailed by later authors (especially Peck, 2011), are the role of politics 
and a focus on what is transferred. Robertson (1991; p. 55) suggests that: “policy lessons 
from abroad often are put forward as politically neutral truths. Beneath this . . . adversaries 
are just as often using such lessons as political weapons.” Indeed, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996; 
p. 355) express concern that “policy transfer is underpinned by pluralist assumptions and the 
key question of whose interest is served by this process goes unasked.” According to Haas 
(1980): “the hallmark of complex interdependence is uncertainty . . . International 
collaboration . . . is an attempt to reduce uncertainty.”  
A perhaps unfairly negatively described group of external consultants acting as policy 
experts facilitates this process, described by McCann and Ward (2009; p. 181) as 
“charismatic consultants who trek from place to place with their policy solutions in their 
laptop hard drives” and by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as “almost interchangeable 
individuals who occupy similar positions across a range of organizations” (p. 152). This is 
supported by the need to demonstrate that policy was transferred, resulting in a cascade of 
project and policy reports. The marketization of the state (see section 2), allied to the 
shrinking of the state in many developed countries means that the expertise to develop or 
transfer policy is no longer available in government organisations which has led to a reliance 
in recent years on external experts. The difficulty is that planners and politicians making the 
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final decision do not always have the expertise to judge the information presented. Thus 
institutional isomorphism serves to further bound the rationality of decision makers. 
As part of the normative process of professionalization, the use of external knowledge can 
be attractive to politicians not only for its intrinsic value but because it helps create distance 
and thus deflect blame. This is a similar process to the creation of quangos (quasi non-
governmental organisations such as advisory environmental bodies or regional transport 
organisations) which can be used to create an ‘objective’ assessment of needs in a particular 
policy area based on policy transfer and expert opinion, but without authority for 
implementation and their funding and very existence subject to the whims of changing 
governments, meaning that such recommendations are commonly diluted, delayed and 
frequently not implemented by those with agency (e.g. governments). While the use of expert 
knowledge has received some attention (e.g. Naess et al., 2013; Tennøy et al., 2015), its role 
in the relationship between politicians and planners requires further research. 
O’Dolan and Rye (2012) identified the two-stage nature of policy transfer. Many actors 
involved in the first stage (gaining the knowledge) are external experts rather than the actual 
implementers themselves, therefore a second stage is often needed for these experts to 
transfer that knowledge and indeed the motivation to public sector planners and 
policymakers. Similarly, the learning process is more complex than simply experts deciding 
on what is best and therefore instituting isomorphic policies, as policy makers already have 
their own policy preferences (Dunlop, 2006), and, as noted by Marsden and Stead (2011), 
policy makers may be less involved in the first stage of policy identification but strongly 
influence the transfer that actually occurs, again leading back to the temporal approach 
advocated by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000). Moreover, the kind of learning transferred can 
depend on the wider institutional setting (Lodge, 2003), including aspects such as 
communication and information sourcing, sharing and interpretation (Wolman and Page, 
2002). Levi-Faur and Vigoda-Gadot (2006) and Marsh and Sharman (2009) explored the 
difference between policy transfer and policy diffusion, the latter being a more natural and 
less proactive process.  
Marsden et al. (2011) identified the key motivations for transport policy transfer as 
“strategic need” and “project or policy collapse”. Regarding the former, they state that 
“policy failure occurs where it is apparent that continuing with current policies will not lead 
to the achievement of the organisation’s objectives.” However, just as some critics suggest 
that it is difficult to ascertain when a policy has actually been transferred (as opposed to a 
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natural evolution in the policy making process), it is also unclear how to decide that a policy 
has failed as opposed to a situation where its implementation has not been adequately 
resourced. Moving on to the second category, the authors identified cities where a planned 
project had failed and a replacement was sought urgently by politicians seeking to limit 
criticism. This could be a factor to increase the likelihood of churn, as the need for a new 
policy is agreed before sufficient analysis has taken place. An additional category noted by 
the authors is legitimization, tying in with earlier comments about political legitimacy, and a 
related category of “enhanced support”, in some cases to accelerate developments that have 
already been planned. Here again, political need is driving the policy decision. 
Inadequate sources of information represented a central difficulty identified in the 
research of Marsden et al. (2011). To begin with, information is often located “informally and 
sometimes quite randomly” (p. 508), and interview respondents stated that there is often too 
much information, and, crucially, the quality of the information is difficult to verify. The 
result is that specific individual contacts are relied upon rather than objective analysis, 
highlighting the importance of individuals. Similarly, transport policy convergence identified 
between Australian states by Bray et al. (2011; p. 531) has occurred despite “no documented 
evidence that the performance of previous strategies has been reviewed and actions in 
subsequent strategies demonstrated to be superior and able to achieve the objectives set for 
them.” This points to other reasons for policy transfer than an objective review of the 
evidence, possibly political motivations or convergence due to uncertainty. 
The analysis of the transfer of urban mobility management policies between European 
cities by Rye et al. (2011) revealed the serendipity of policy transfer, heavily dependent on 
the interests and enthusiasms of specific actors. It means that seeking and finding a new 
policy in the first place may not be an exhaustive search, and the lack of good information 
makes it difficult to validate if it is actually a suitable policy, which leads to a higher 
likelihood of inappropriate transfer (or indeed incomplete or uninformed). This leads to a 
higher risk of failure, which brings a need for a new policy therefore high risk of churn. As 
Marsden et al. (2011) point out, “unsystematic search” and “quality of the evidence base” are 
barriers to policy transfer. These can also be interpreted not solely as barriers but as reasons 
why a policy may still transfer but do so inappropriately or incompletely, leading to failure 
and the potential for churn. Both theoretical and empirical studies suggest the dangers of 
inappropriate and incomplete policy transfer, but overlooked so far has been the issue of how 
this can lead to an ongoing process of continual transfer with its own negative effects. 
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4. Policy churn 
Policy transfer considered as institutional isomorphism manifests as convergence, due to 
factors such as those identified by Bennett (1991): emulation, elite networking, 
harmonization and penetration by external actors. What is not considered is the tendency 
towards an ongoing turnover of policy. Thus the isomorphism is related to institutions such as 
organisations, processes and policy types, but not necessarily to stability in individual policy 
instruments and programmes. Is policy transfer more about looking for good policies and 
knowledge or merely gaining legitimacy? This section will examine the relationship between 
institutional isomorphism and policy churn. 
 Peck (2001) contends that in a modern state rescaled by a neoliberal political agenda, 
“there is always another local ‘solution’ over the horizon to emulate” (p452), leading to an 
increase in policy turnover: “the technocratic lubrication of channels for ‘policy transfer’ and 
‘policy learning’, means that a dynamic of almost perpetual reform is generated” (p452). 
Maintaining the previous definitions of different aspects of policy that may be churned, this 
dynamic is observed primarily in policy instruments. Observers of the last decade of transport 
policy in the UK would recognise something of this “continued churning of policy strategies” 
that diffuse reforming energy and can easily lose sight of the original policy goals. Such 
policy churn and reorganisation of governance scales can also lead to “objective fatigue” 
(Docherty et al., 2007). Having said that, some difference in higher level policy goals can be 
seen over time, especially through political cycles; for example, in the UK, the previous 
motorway building “predict and provide” approach of the Conservative government gave 
way to a narrative of sustainable transport during the Labour years. Yet as mentioned earlier, 
despite a lot of effort on narrative building, policy instruments and the level of calibration 
employed remained rather weak and tended to be churned without changing the policy goal 
even while tacitly admitting that it would not be reached. The neoliberal system did not 
prevent a change in policy goal between administrations, but rather prevented the deployment 
of policy instruments of sufficient impact to achieve the new goals. 
A full analysis of the structure and agency approach (advocated by Evans and Davies, 
1999) is a larger topic beyond the direct scope of this paper, but some key aspects of the 
theory are relevant here, such as how the uneven hollowing out (Rhodes, 1994) and filling in 
(Jones et al., 2004; Goodwin et al., 2005) of institutions has created asymmetrical acting 
capacity. MacKinnon et al. (2010) argue that any consideration of the role of actors requires 
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an approach that can assess structure and agency, and they note that Jessop (2001) is critical 
of Giddens’s (1984) structuration theory for “assuming that a particular structure is equally 
constraining or enabling for all actors” (p.274). Jarvis (2014) noted that institutional forms 
may ostensibly converge but that does not mean that individuals are unable to work within it. 
Committed activists can implement disruptive policy instruments, but in most cases they are 
still required to work within the dominant neoliberal paradigm. For example, Henderson 
(2011) showed how cycling activists overcame a pro-car road space allocation system, 
although it was achieved counter-intuitively by building an alliance with property developers 
who see value in improving urban space for their intended client market.  
Moving on towards the emergence of policy churn, DiMaggio & Powell (1983; p. 152) 
wrote that “the ubiquity of certain kinds of structural arrangements can more likely be 
credited to the universality of mimetic processes than to any concrete evidence that the 
adopted models enhance efficiency.” This lack of evidence may be a result not simply of a 
lack of monitoring but the way in which it is done. According to Meyer and Rowan (1977): 
“the more an organization’s structure is derived from institutionalized myths, the more it 
maintains elaborate displays of confidence, satisfaction, and good faith, internally and 
externally.” (p358). These displays include “rationalized rituals of inspection and evaluation” 
(p359).  
Oliver (1991) suspects that institutionalist scholars have exhibited too great a focus on 
passive acquiescence to isomorphic pressures, which represents only one response to 
institutional pressure, the other four being compromise, avoidance, defiance or manipulation. 
For example, the process of disguising nonconformity exhibited in Hong Kong education 
institutions as revealed by Jarvis (2014). Stead et al. (2008) demonstrate the importance of 
understanding the often different institutional context of the country receiving the policy, as 
supportive environments and cultural norms may present the success of the policy, yet 
DeJong and Geerlings (2005) show that even transferring policy between similar institutional 
environments is no guarantor of success. Viewing from different perspectives can also be 
illuminating here; for instance, in some cases politicians manipulate the new policies that 
their experts and civil servants bring them, in order to fit their needs and not expose them to 
anything deemed undesirable, such as the need for new investment or the risk of failure 
leading to negative media coverage. 
Attempting to influence institutions consciously is also subject to a number of limitations, 
as summarised by Pierson (2004): many effects will be unexpected and potentially longer 
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lasting than the current problem, actors or organisations may change or disappear over time, 
and the application of generic solutions may not fit the problem. Various frameworks have 
been put forward to model the process of institutional change (Monios and Lambert, 2013). 
Part of this discussion includes the role of political organisations, which attempt to exert 
influence but do not have the same agency enjoyed by, for example, economic organisations.  
Policy churn can result from a lack of a cohesive and consistent agenda (Marschall and 
Shah, 2005), in some cases the result of informal elites governing city policy from an 
economic development agenda and succeeding in preventing more progressive policies from 
gaining traction. This political aspect is particularly pertinent, especially with regard to the 
recognition that it can take different forms. Marschall and Shah (2005) highlight the 
importance of political entrepreneurs in preventing policy churn and enabling consistency, 
while studies of policy implementation note the role of political champions to drive a new 
policy (e.g. Ison and Rye, 2003). Yet political leadership can equally be about implementing 
an unpopular but successful policy (e.g. congestion charging) as it can be about major 
investment in vanity or civic pride projects (e.g. high speed rail). Leadership can also come 
from outside the political class, through lobbyists and activists, as noted above. On the other 
hand, political leadership is not necessarily the result of a single individual but can be an 
incremental process involving many actors (Isaksson and Richardson, 2009). Similarly, 
Marsden and Stead (2011) note that political will is potentially the most important element in 
terms of “who does the transfer” and can override technical recommendations from planners. 
That is why this paper widens the discussion to political structure and the role of 
isomorphism in providing to some degree an illusion of political competence and providing 
fertile conditions for policy churn. Meyer and Rowan (1977; p. 346) note that 
‘‘institutionalised rationality becomes a myth with explosive organising potential.”  
A recent example of this aspect of monitoring as performance is shown in benchmarking 
of e-government in the EU by Codagnone et al. (2015; p. 305), whereby “High scores in EU 
benchmarking have contributed to increasing the institutionally-perceived quality but not 
necessarily the real quality and utility of e-government services.” This relates strongly to the 
ceremonial monitoring mentioned above, and means that if policy success is not being 
monitored effectively, then deciding on whether or not a policy is working and whether or not 
a new policy is needed can have no empirical basis and makes churn more likely. In the 
transport sector, Mononen and Leviäkangas (2016) identify the difficulties in monitoring 
transport indicators such as safety performance, while Gudmundsson et al. (2005) identified 
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several difficulties with benchmarking of policy due to differences from the original private 
sector application of benchmarking. Challenges include the service rather than product nature 
of transport, culturally dependent perceptions and a lack of data on external effects. Such 
complications mean that it can be difficult to ascertain if a policy instrument has been 
successful and whether reasons for perceived failure would be overcome by the new 
proposed policy.  
The competition state seeks where possible to achieve policy aims through marketization 
and outsourcing rather than through direct intervention which involves investment, staffing 
and time, as well as the responsibility in the media for lack of performance. Isomorphism 
means that what is politically acceptable becomes narrower and disjunctive policy 
intervention becomes less likely. Policy transfer is not a neutral process but socially 
constructed based on paradigms (e.g. neoliberal or Keynesian) so it is not necessarily the 
seeking of best practice but for other reasons that policy is transferred: “it can be difficult to 
isolate deliberative learning from other forms of emulation and transfer. . . . the near 
impossibility of rationally determining ‘success’ or ‘failure’ outside the framework of 
particular policy paradigms and belief systems means that learning behaviour remains in the 
eye of the beholder” (Peck, 2011; p. 787).  Using transport policy as an example, the move 
from a Keynesian to a neoliberal paradigm in the 1980s meant that policies seeking to disrupt 
the status quo by, for instance, giving road space to cyclists, are deemed unacceptable 
therefore behavioural incentives are preferred. Is that because objective study has shown that 
these incentives are more effective than investing in segregated cycle paths or because these 
are the only measures politicians will allow, due to the neoliberal paradigm dominating 
discourse that does not see the role of government as interventionist and does not want to face 
criticism in the media?  
Marsden et al. (2014; p. 72) showed that behaviour change incentives (so-called “smarter 
choices”) to reduce demand for transport continue to be preferred in the UK to more stringent 
disincentives (e.g. road charging to reduce driving, using land use planning to prevent sprawl) 
even in the knowledge that they will not achieve the stated policy goals, but their choice of 
instruments is constrained by “normative ideas about what constitutes legitimate attempts to 
influence behaviour.” This leads to outsourcing behaviour influence instruments (e.g. Aldred, 
2012 on outsourcing cycling policy instruments to voluntary organisations) and a reluctance 
to modify the overall policy paradigm (Tennøy, 2010; Cass & Faulconbridge, 2016). 
According to Goulden et al. (2014; p. 144): “it creates an illusion of choice, seeking to 
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achieve collective goals without directly challenging the neoliberal paradigm.” Such 
strategies result from both the political unacceptability but also the reluctance to risk 
economic growth by reducing infrastructure and housing construction. Thus, using the 
terminology of Howlett and Cashore (2009), instruments and calibrations may be churned 
within a fixed domain of settings and logic. An example of churning at the level of 
calibration without changing the system logic is the serial modification of UK subsidy 
programmes for modal shift of freight from road to rail, progressing from Track Access Grant 
(TAG: established in 1993) to Company Neutral Revenue Support (CNRS: 2004-2007) to 
Rail Environmental Benefit Procurement Scheme (REPS: 2007-2010) and then Modal Shift 
Revenue Support (MSRS: since 2010) (Monios, 2014). 
Lodge (2003; p. 161) outlines the many institutional conditions that make evaluation and 
self-correction difficult, concluding that “policy transfer and learning do not constitute 
‘rational decision-making’ in terms of a complete evaluation of all possible policy options. 
Rather, they represent limited searches for templates that appear more legitimate, appropriate, 
or successful.” According to Marsden et al. (2012; p. 905, 913): “search parameters are 
significantly influenced by preconceptions of the nature of the preferred solutions. . . . 
Nowhere was the motivation to consider new policies a value-neutral search for the best 
solution.” While policy search is not random, neither is it purely rational. Using the example 
of public transit development in Chicago, Farmer (2011; p. 1156) shows how the competition 
state prioritises “megaprojects and infrastructure that help business gain competitive 
advantages and keep them connected within global networks as well as providing financing 
and amenities for gentrification, tourism, and cultural consumption.” In order to legitimise 
such projects, the use of quantitative modelling and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) represent a 
preferred analytical technique within the neoliberal paradigm (see Banister, 2011 on the use 
of the value of time in CBA). Such large projects are better categorised as civic pride (or 
political vanity) projects rather than policy churn, but their motivations derive from a similar 
background. Political pressure may be used to encourage a positive CBA or, alternatively, to 
ignore the CBA result and approve a project anyway (Docherty et al., 2007). 
 
5. Developing a framework for identifying a movement from transfer to churn 
From the preceding analysis, the key points that are likely to lead to churn can be 
identified. From the bottom-up perspective: serendipity of transfer, difficulty evaluating 
evidence, the central role played by external policy entrepreneurs and their influence (or not) 
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on civil servants and politicians. Looking from the top down, politicians apply political 
pressure for expedient change while reluctant to break fully with past policies. Potentially 
linking these two perspectives and requiring further research is the relationship between 
isomorphic organisational forms, obtaining funding from central/national or international 
organisations and securing legitimacy in both government and the media. Transferred policies 
and ideas are not politically neutral, and the literature highlighted concerns regarding whose 
interests are served by transfer. Isomorphic institutions are potentially more able to be 
coerced by political expediency. DiMaggio and Powell predict that institutional isomorphism 
is more likely to occur as a result of the existence of factors such as inter-organisational 
dependence, uncertainty between means and end, ambiguity of goals, reliance on academic 
and professional credentials, and the greater centrality of resource supply and greater 
dependence on a small number of sources for vital resources.  
The framework of key aspects likely to lead from policy transfer to policy churn is 
presented in Table 1. Some of the factors are familiar from the policy implementation 
literature, a full analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper (for good overviews see 
Timms, 2011; Cerna, 2013). Similarly, the spatial planning literature (again, beyond the 
scope of this paper but see Hrelja, 2011 and Newman, 2008) demonstrates the gap between 
what is written in policy documents and strategies and the day-to-day decision making and 
implementation “on the ground.” The crossover between these bodies of literature gives 
additional weight to the hypothesis that good implementation will reduce the need for policy 
transfer and hence churn. While policy transfer and policy implementation are generally 
considered separate if related fields of enquiry, perhaps their interdependence is not 
considered closely enough. Some of the key requirements for successful policy 
implementation (valid link between cause and effect, sufficient resources, political 
leadership) demonstrate the close link between the two processes. Therefore, the most 
important question to ask in order to avoid churn is: is the current policy instrument 
unsuccessful because of the policy design or due to a lack of any of the requirements for good 
policy implementation, and is it proven that the new policy does not exhibit similar 
weaknesses? Future research needs to explore in more detail the link between policy design, 
policy implementation and policy transfer. Any weakness within this three-part framework 
has the potential to lead to policy churn.  
The factors in this framework are the parameters against which to gather empirical 
evidence for the analysis of a process of policy churn. They are influential factors that may 
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manifest in different ways in different cases, and not all will necessarily be present in each 
case of policy churn. The empirical examples provided in the table are indicative based on 
empirical work in the transport sector, but they could equally be drawn from other policy 
areas such as health or education. Thus a full empirical application of all factors of the 
framework to a single case could be produced in a number of sectors. 
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Table 1. Framework of factors leading from policy transfer to policy churn 
No. Factor Example in the transport sector How it may lead to churn 
1 Lack of rigorous testing of 
whether status quo has failed 
and if so whether it was due to 
the policy itself or poor 
implementation. 
 
Difficulties in monitoring transport 
system indicators such as safety 
performance (Mononen and 
Leviäkangas, 2016). 
Poor implementation of existing policy and 
higher likelihood of seeking a new policy 
that seems cheaper or easier. 
2 Politicians reluctant to devote 
resources or take increased 
public responsibility. 
 
Outsourcing pro-cycling initiatives to 
voluntary organisations (Aldred, 2012). 
Poor implementation of existing policy and 
higher likelihood of seeking a new policy 
that seems cheaper or easier, which is likely 
to fail for the same reason, therefore churn. 
3 Serendipity of transfer. 
 
Transfer of mobility management 
programmes from one city to another 
based on the interest of individual 
stakeholders (Rye et al., 2011). 
Higher likelihood of inappropriate or 
incomplete transfer, therefore failure 
therefore churn. 
4 The central role played by 
external experts as policy 
entrepreneurs and their 
influence on civil servants and 
politicians.  
Strong role played by academics and 
consultants through EU-funded project 
networks (O’Dolan & Rye, 2012).  
External experts more likely to promote 
similar policies which may be positive but 
have the potential for inappropriate 
transfer, therefore failure therefore churn.  
5 Lack of rigorous testing of 
likely success of new policy 
(partly due to lack of 
information). 
 
Difficult to gather benchmarking data 
on external effects of a proposed 
transport scheme (Gudmundsson et al., 
2005). 
Higher likelihood of inappropriate or 
incomplete transfer, therefore failure 
therefore churn. 
6 Politicians apply political 
pressure for expedient change 
due to policy collapse 
(coercive pressures). 
 
Funding withdrawn at a late stage for a 
tram scheme led to a fast-tracked bus 
improvement scheme (Marsden et al., 
2011). 
Rushed policy transfer therefore higher 
likelihood of inappropriate or incomplete 
transfer therefore failure therefore churn. 
7 Uncertainty brings more 
isomorphic institutions and 
monitoring becomes more 
ceremonial than useful 
(mimetic pressures). 
 
Convergence of transport governance 
forms and policies across the devolved 
jurisdictions within the UK (Shaw et 
al., 2009). 
Success of policy not objectively assessed 
therefore higher likelihood of poor 
decisions therefore failure therefore churn. 
8 Range of what is acceptable 
becomes narrower (normative 
pressures). 
 
Policies that reduce travel are less 
acceptable than funding for electric 
vehicles that reduce emissions without 
reducing travel (Marsden et al., 2014). 
Becomes more difficult to bring in a totally 
new and disruptive policy (e.g. cycle 
lanes). 
9 Greater centrality of resource 
supply and/or dependence on a 
small number of sources for 
vital resources (e.g. EU funds 
or national funds). 
 
EU funding for multi-nation transport 
policy transfer projects (Timms, 2011). 
Similar to 8, also limits range of acceptable 
policies, increases selection of similar 
policies which may not be appropriate for 
each case.  
10 Politicians reluctant to break 
fully with past policies  
 
Reluctance to reduce spending on 
infrastructure due to economic growth 
priorities (Marsden et al., 2012). 
Rather than implement a new policy, 
continue with a new version of the old 
failing policy or a combination of both. 
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The factors in the framework already suggest some features of the kinds of policy 
instruments more likely to be churned: less infrastructure based therefore easy to remove (e.g. 
bus lanes), more expensive therefore attractive to discontinue (e.g. subsidies for modal shift) 
or less popular (e.g. bike lanes). Yet there are numerous influences that determine individual 
cases, therefore empirical testing is required. In some cases, the long-term nature of major 
infrastructure investment means that politicians may prefer short-term policy instruments 
(e.g. investment in electric vehicles for government departments), but in other cases 
governments may find it more politically acceptable to fund a large project (e.g. high speed 
rail) rather than many small investments. Policy churn can result from policy instruments that 
were unsuccessful in meeting their goals, but also purely because they were unpopular and 
therefore decision makers realised that they would not achieve their goals so the calibration 
passes through several iterations before ever being implemented, e.g. The UK Labour 
government’s plan for road charging which was continually postponed and never 
implemented. Some policies are successful yet popular with some groups of voters and 
unpopular with others, thus the likelihood of being churned will depend on the interests of the 
politician making the decision (e.g. congestion charging or bus lanes). 
Applying the framework developed in this paper to empirical cases will be subject to the 
methodological challenges of measuring, comparing and benchmarking policy discussed in 
section 3 (Gudmundsson et al., 2005; Howlett and Cashore, 2009). Howlett and Cashore 
(2009; p. 38) recognise the dependent variable problem in studies of policy, leading “many 
scholars to inadvertently conflate several distinct change processes present in specific 
elements of policy.” In order to provide greater clarity between processes, their six-point 
policy framework discussed in section 1 distinguishes between “goals (more abstract), 
objectives (less abstract), and settings (least abstract).” Therefore, the framework developed 
in this paper will need to be calibrated through empirical testing in order to determine not 
only which kinds of policies are more subject to churn, but also to what degree it is mostly 
policy instruments being churned rather than higher level objectives and top level policy 
goals. The analysis in this paper suggests it will mostly be instruments, as institutional 
isomorphism places constraints on changing goals and objectives, but empirical examination 
is required.  
Policy churn was defined earlier in the paper as changing a policy without establishing a 
clear link between the reasons for failure of the existing policy and how these will be 
overcome by the new policy. Case selection presents an initial difficulty, as a longitudinal 
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perspective would be ideal but once a suitable candidate of churn has been identified, it may 
be difficult to obtain evidence of what happened regarding policy design, implementation and 
transfer in the years before. Such data can be gathered through interviews and documents but 
gaps may remain. However, the increasing availability of documents and news archives 
online makes the task easier than in the past. Moreover, examining the progress of a 
particular policy area over time must also recognise how a range of policies affect each other 
in their relative appropriation of resources from a single source (e.g. the success of different 
transport policies depends partly on their share of the transport budget). 
Evans (2009) and Heichel et al. (2005) identify several differences in the research 
approaches applied by scholars in the study of policy and discuss the implications for 
drawing firm conclusions with regard to policy transfer and diffusion. For example, the 
difficulties selecting the limited field of study to a policy area, a single policy goal or single 
instrument, or the difficulty of interpreting results when some aspects (e.g. policy goal, 
setting, instrument, calibration) converge and others diverge. As noted above, selecting the 
time dimension for a study can also be difficult and making clear measurements of before and 
after. These methodological challenges are common to social science researchers and are 
certainly present in the study of policy transfer, but they are perhaps more serious in relation 
to policy churn because ideally a succession of transfers or policy changes should be 
followed in order to trace the churn process, which would require a longer duration and 
increase the difficulties of data acquisition.  
 
6. Conclusion and research agenda 
In concluding, it is necessary to reiterate that the intention of this paper is not to suggest 
that policy transfer is really just churn. The objective is that, by identifying factors that 
influence how policy transfer can become policy churn, this framework may help to improve 
the quality and efficacy of policy transfer. 
Policy transfer is a necessary process, and indeed it is occurring regardless of whether we 
study it or not. Good policy transfer improves the status quo by adopting best practice from 
elsewhere, but there are some elements of churn that should be guarded against. In particular, 
there is a concern that churn results from a lack of devoting the full resources required for 
implementation. There is a large literature on policy implementation therefore we know to 
some extent what is needed. Future research could explore if there is a relationship between 
good implementation and low transfer. 
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According to Peck (2001; p. 452): “the continued churning of policy strategies tends to 
(over)stretch the capacities and diffuse the energy of oppositional movements, rather than 
opening up the space for more progressive local initiatives.” This also relates to the 
disagreement about whether increasing devolution and regionalism is good because it enables 
bottom-up processes for regions to activate new policies for economic development, versus 
the other view contending that it is just more churn that does not address the restrictions 
imposed by the unchanged system logic. The framework developed in this paper can aid the 
identification and analysis of this distinction, by gathering evidence against the key 
influencing factors. 
Three research agendas can be derived from this paper. First, the need for an empirical 
analysis of policy churn using the framework developed in this paper, recognising the 
methodological challenges already discussed. Second, to identify whether there is a trend of 
the kinds of policies that are more or less likely to be churned, the types of institutional 
settings that lead to greater or lesser churn and whether there is a link between policy churn 
and a reluctance to devote the necessary resources to implementation. The role of legitimacy 
in the wider political activities and narratives of transport and other organisations could be 
explored in greater depth, including the role of political cycles and the normative aspects of 
defining policy failure. Finally, a number of related research topics can be derived from the 
preceding discussion, such as the relationship between politicians and planners in policy 
development and implementation, the relationship between policy/strategy documents and 
policy implementation and the use of expert knowledge in both formulating policy directly 
and transferring policies from elsewhere. Therefore, the framework developed in this paper is 
useful not only in its full form but also as a background against which to explore a number of 
individual elements. 
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